Security and defence has been at the heart of Labour’s ‘reset’ with its European allies, and the UK and Germany signed an ambitious join declaration on enhanced defence cooperation after only three weeks in office. Nicolai von Ondarza and Claudia Major unpack the commitments in the declaration and the challenges the two countries will have to overcome for it to be successful.
Ukraine, France, Germany, Estonia, Poland, Estonia – the travel plan of Labour’s Defence Secretary John Healey seems to prove that European security will indeed be Labour’s ‘first foreign and defence priority’. The cornerstone of this ‘reset’ with Europe is Germany. On 24 July, after hardly three weeks in office, Healey and German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius signed an ambitious ‘Joint Declaration on Enhanced Defence Cooperation between Germany the UK’.
The narrative for this declaration is both obvious and noteworthy. It is obvious in highlighting the need for closer defence cooperation in the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Europe’s deteriorating strategic environment and the potential US shift away from Europe to the Indo Pacific. With the UK and Germany now the two biggest European defence spenders and the two largest European military supporters of Ukraine, London and Berlin are key if Europeans are to take on more responsibility for their security. This recognition translates into an ambitious partnership aimed at contributing to Europe’s deterrence and defence, not only at NATO’s eastern flank but also in the broader Euro-Atlantic area. There is clearly a leadership ambition that mirrors the one enshrined in the Franco-British Lancaster House Treaties.
Politically noteworthy is that Labour has chosen security and defence as the main angle for their ‘reset’ with European allies and the EU. Although Germany and the UK have been close allies for the last 70 years, their relationship used to revolve much more around economic and cultural ties. Defence cooperation never really took off, despite some successful industrial projects like the Eurofighter aircraft. By focusing on this area, Labour has a double advantage: it avoids entangling itself too closely in a single market/customs union debate, and emphasises an area where the UK has something to offer, at a time when other allies – not only in Washington – look less reliable.
The early diplomatic British-German declaration is part of a larger re-engagement with European allies. Similarly to Healey, Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s first trip took him to Germany, Poland and Sweden.
What these visits have in common is that they are re-engaging, not yet ‘resetting’ existing bilateral relationships. Take Germany and the UK: although the bilateral relationship suffered from Brexit, a timid normalisation had started after the Windsor agreement, even if at a significantly lower level than pre-Brexit. Progress was made specifically in foreign affairs, where the German and British ministers signed a joint declaration in 2021, evoking very similar joint interests. Since then, they have held two rounds of a Strategic Dialogue. Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock and then-Foreign Secretary David Cameron had a very good working relationship, inter alia with joint initiatives on Israel/Gaza.
Yet, there were clearly limits to that timid normalisation, particularly in defence. When Rishi Sunak made his late inaugural visit to Berlin in April 2024, he was hoping to seal a defence deal. Yet, due to German hesitation about substantially engaging with the outgoing UK government, the only result was a task force to enhance bilateral defence cooperation.
In contrast, the 2024 defence declaration underlines the commitment by both Labour and the SPD-led government to quickly get substantial results. Labour has clearly been preparing its agenda, and Berlin was willing to support it. Yet, they also build on those previous elements that remain valid: the emphasis on joint interests in Euro-Atlantic security, shared values such as the rule of law, and their commitment to NATO. In operational terms, familiar elements include pledging to foster defence industrial cooperation, enhance interoperability, support Ukraine and address ‘emerging threats’ like cyber and climate change.
New elements are the intent to develop – with European partners – deep precision strike (DPS) capabilities, to set up a ‘senior-level expert group’ to support the defence ministries, and to foster military-to-military contacts. Politically, the joint declaration thus serves mostly as a starting point, rather than a final destination. Though Olaf Scholz and Keir Starmer have met already quite often since the latter took office – at the NATO and EPC summits and for the Euro 2024 final in Berlin – Starmer is expected for his formal inaugural visit to Berlin by the end of summer. Both have committed to striking a ‘deep UK-Germany defence agreement’ on a full government-to-government level.
The ambition is thus high. But to be successful, three challenges need to be tackled.
First, both must demonstrate the added value of British-German cooperation. Although the UK and Germany are now the biggest defence spenders in Europe with similar interests, their armed forces are on different trajectories, with Germany focusing on land forces, and the UK on naval and air capabilities. In key projects, like future combat air systems, they are engaged in separate projects. Beyond the crucial DPS project, Berlin and London need to add further projects with tangible benefits, for instance anti-submarine warfare and supply chain cooperation. They should also address thorny topics like defence exports.
The second issue is money. Both countries face economic and fiscal challenges, with little leeway for additional projects. Both will struggle to keep their defence budgets sustainably at 2%, let alone rise to 2.5 % as Labour has committed to and as NATO is discussing.
And then there is the political question on how this bilateral cooperation will relate to the planned EU-UK security pact. The EU aims to make defence industry one of the priorities for the next EU Commission – though healthy scepticism should be applied on how far these initiatives will go. The current conditions for third country participation in EU defence initiatives remain unacceptable for London, for instance regarding intellectual property rights and access for UK defence industry. A clash between British interests to expand defence industrial cooperation with European allies and EU initiatives cannot be excluded. London should therefore strive to keep its – likely quicker – bilateral ambitions compatible with plans for the EU-UK security relationship.
Finally, time is of essence: Germany is going to the polls in September 2025, with a government change rather likely. A more formal, deeper agreement would need to be signed by spring 2025, before the election campaign kicks in. To make the new agreement last and improve the chances for a broader German-British re-engagement, the two defence ministers will have to make progress quickly.
By Nicolai von Ondarza, head of EU/Europe Research Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, and Dr Claudia Major, head of the International Security Division, SWP, Berlin.
For transparency: one of the authors was involved in preparatory talks for the declaration.